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Rationalists, wearing square hats,
Think, in square rooms,
Looking at the floor,
Looking at the ceiling.
They confine themselves
To right-angled triangles.
If they tried rhomboids,
Cones, waving lines, ellipsesAs, for example, the ellipse of the half-moonRationalists would wear sombreros.1
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The informed law and humanities reader can hardly fail to be aware that
the field of economics has undergone a "behavioral revolution" over the
past several decades, and that this revolution has spilled over into the legal
academy. Open an economics journal these days and you are likely to find
any number of articles billing themselves as "behavioral" in orientation.
Similarly, law reviews are filled with articles bearing titles ranging from
"A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics" '2 to "Harnessing
Altruistic Theory and Behavioral Law and Economics to Rein in
Executive Salaries" 3 and "Some Lessons for Law from Behavioral
Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers. '
What does this behavioral turn in economics and legal scholarship
signify? In economics, "behavioral" means adapting insights and methods
from cognitive psychology to choices that economists had previously
analyzed with a rational actor model. Traditional economics assumes that
individuals are able to process information quickly and without mistakes.
Behavioralists modify the traditional model with findings from cognitive
psychology showing that individuals fall prey to common and predictable
errors in information processing such as framing,5 over-confidence,6 and
hindsight bias, 7 to name only a few of our cognitive failings.8
2. Christine Jolls,
Cass R. Sunstein, & Richard H. Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L REV. 1471 (1998).
3. Michael B. Dorf, Softening Pharaoh'sHeart: Harnessing Altruistic Theory and Behavioral
Law and Economics to Rein in Executive Salaries,51 BUFFALO L. REV. 811 (2003).
4. Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope. Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from Behavioral
Economics About Stockbrokers and SophisticatedCustomers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 627 (1996).
5. Framing refers to the tendency of people to process information differently depending on how
it is presented to them. For example:
Imagine that you are given $300, and then offered a choice of either
(a) an additional $100 for sure, or
(b) a gamble that pays an additional $200 if a fair coin comes up heads or nothing if it comes up
tails.
Which do you prefer, (a) or (b)?
Now suppose that you are given $500 and offered a choice of either
(a') paying $100 for sure, or
(b') a gamble that requires you to pay either $200 if a fair coin comes up heads or 0 if it comes up
tails.
Since the final outcomes of (a) and (a') and (b) and (b') are mathematically identical, people should
not choose differently depending on how the question is presented (framed) to them. But experiments
reveal that they do.
6. Over-confidence refers to the tendency of people's judgments to be correct less often than they
think are. For example, ask people to guess the number of member countries in the United Nations,
and to pick two other numbers such that they are 90 percent certain that the actual number is between
these two numbers. If people are appropriately confident, 90 of all guesses should fall within each
chooser's upper and lower bounds. Instead, the actual percentage of guesses falling within the bounds
is much lower.
7. Hindsight bias is the tendency of people to think that events that have occurred are more
predictable than they actually were. For example, some analysts have argued that it should have been
obvious-based on the evidence available at the time-that the Japanese were going to attack Pearl
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Two recent books, one by Dan Ariely and the other by Richard Thaler
and Cass Sunstein, are terrific additions to the behavioral economics
literature intended for a popular audience. Both books present important
behavioral insights in an engaging and accessible manner, and both spell
out the implications of these insights for contemporary social and legal
issues. The question addressed here is whether the humanities-oriented
readers of this journal should be interested in these books and, more
generally, whether they should care about the behavioral turn in legal
scholarship at all.9 How might the quantitative data of experimental
cognitive psychology improve upon the rich and complex narratives of
human decisionmaking offered by psychoanalysis and other humanistic
psychologies? Is behavioral economics fundamentally at odds with a
humanistic framework that focuses on mental phenomena such as fantasy,
repression and unconscious conflict?
While each of us--one an economist and one a student of
psychoanalysis-has slightly different answers to these questions, we
nevertheless agree that cognitive psychology offers some important
insights into unconscious distortions and biases in individual
decisionmaking. And we also agree that these insights have some
surprising overlaps with the teachings of humanistic psychologies such as
psychoanalysis. After summarizing these two books, the second half of
this review essay identifies several of these intriguing overlaps. Although
behavioral economics relies almost exclusively on cognitive psychology,
and thus ultimately does not go very far in "humanizing" the rational
actor, we nevertheless encourage readers of this journal to consider the
ways in which the findings of cognitive psychology can supplement and
strengthen more traditionally humanistic ways of understanding human
(ir)rationality.
Harbor in 1941. But in reaching conclusions after the fact about what people should have been able to
predict beforehand, we habitually tend to rely not only on the evidence available at the time, but on the
fact that some event actually did occur. Put simply, things look more obvious in hindsight than they
were ex ante.
8. Wikiepedia lists more than 100 different biases that psychologists have identified. See
Wikipedia, List of Cognitive Biases, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List-ofcognitive-biases (last visited
July 31, 2009).
9. Behavioral economics clearly matters as an intellectual agenda with wide application and
aspirations. On one account at least, behavioral economics has been elevated to the theory of
governance in the Obama administration. See Franklin Foer & Noam Scheiber, Nudge-ocracy, THE
NEW REPUBLIC, May 6, 2009 at 22) (suggesting that Nudge's influence goes far beyond Cass
Sunstein's appointment as head of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (the so-called
Regulatory Czar)). In Foer and Scheiber's (somewhat overstated) view, behavioral economics is
nothing less than a "new theory of the state."
For an insightful assessment of the role of behavioral economics in legal theory, see On Amir & Orley
Lobel, Stumble, Predict,Nudge: How Behavioral Economics Informs Law And Policy, 108 COLUM.L.
REV. 2098, 2100 (2009) (reviewing NUDGE and PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL and highlighting the
works' contribution to a middle ground "between command-and-control regulation and deregulated
markets.") On these grounds alone, it behooves all of us to be familiar with the insights this social
science hybrid has to offer, although we will not discuss these issues in great detail here, especially
since they are so ably handled by Amir & Lobel.
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One clarification at the outset. The term rationality can have very
different meanings depending on the context. In economics, the term
usually denotes individual decisionmaking that is aimed at maximizing an
individual's utility, whatever that may entail. In the humanities, by
contrast, the term rationality frequently refers to decisions that are
consistent not simply with personal preferences or self-interest but with
some external measure such as moral goodness, or society's view of the
good life. As it happens, many discussions of rationality do not
distinguish clearly between these subjective and objective definitions of
rationality. In this review, we adhere more closely to the former than to
the latter. As used here, rationality means the individual's capacity for
making decisions that are consistent with the individual's own conscious
beliefs and preferences. But contrary to traditional economics, our
definition of rationality does not accept all decisions as furthering an
individual's beliefs and desires. For example, a traditional economist
might view the decision to quit one's job because a co-worker came to
work late as rational in the sense that it was deliberate and freely chosen,
but we would agree with behaviorists that the decision might nevertheless
be irrational to the extent it was distorted by certain unconscious
assumptions, biases or emotional influences. Because of the sheer number
of such influences on decisionmaking, the idea of rationality itself - the
possibility that any decision could be free from unconscious assumptions,
biases or emotions - may be brought into question by behavioral research.
Nevertheless, for our purposes, we adhere to the idea that choices can be
described as more or less rational in the subjective sense of the term.
I. PREDICTIONS AND NUDGES

Dan Ariely begins his spirited and entertaining book Predictably
Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions, with a startling
story about his hard-fought personal odyssey to recover from severe burns
he suffered at age 18. Right from the start, we understand that this book is
not going to be a typically dry and impersonal academic study. The
description of his experience as a burn victim humanizes Ariely in a way
that parallels his attempt to bring greater psychological depth to the
discipline of economics. We believe him when he says his struggle with
unbearable pain opened his eyes to the ways in which his otherwise wellmeaning and intelligent caregivers nevertheless could behave at times in
irrational, nearly sadistic ways. Exploring these lapses in judgment on the
part of ordinary, well-intentioned people is Ariely's project.
Put in economic terms, the premise of PredictablyIrrationalis that the
traditional rational actor model fails to account for the fact that people in
the real world often do not make decisions that are consistent with their
own conscious beliefs, intentions or interests. The behavioral challenge to
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classical economics is, at base, incredibly simple: "You economists say
you want to predict human behavior as accurately as possible. But we can
out-predict you." If behaviorists such as Ariely succeed in proving that
their models can outperform the standard model-and that's still an open
question in some cases-traditional economists have to concede that their
reliance on the assumption of rationality is outmoded, and apart from
purely aesthetic considerations of simplicity and elegance, has little to
recommend it."° Ariely undertakes to dismantle the traditional rational
actor model chapter by chapter, devoting each to a particular kind of error
in everyday reasoning processes.
Predictably Irrationalthus provides a sweeping overview of the kinds
of cognitive errors that lead people in self-defeating directions such as
taking on unmanageable credit card debt, buying things they do not need,
or paying too much for a new house. In chapter after chapter, Ariely puts
human irrationality on display. We learn that attractiveness is measured
relative to those standing nearby, that sometimes people will work harder
when they are not paid, that sexual arousal leads to poor decisionmaking
(hardly surprising), and that individuals overvalue items in their
possession.
Each cognitive error Ariely identifies is supported by
experiments described in fascinating and extensive detail. For example,
Ariely devotes one chapter to the anchoring bias, the mental process by
which individuals tie the value of a good to some other (sometimes
random) referent. He supports the existence of the anchoring bias with an
experiment showing that students asked to write down an arbitrary
number, such as the last two digits of their social security number, tended
to use this number to "anchor" the price they would be willing to pay for
certain goods. Astonishingly, subjects whose social security numbers
ended with high digits were willing to pay more (on average) than those
with low digits. It is hard to imagine a more obvious stick in the eye of
the rational actor model.
Ariely draws out the broader prescriptive implications of this research.
In his view, understanding the phenomenon of anchoring should lead to a
life of greater self-examination, one that focuses us on the role of arbitrary
associations in our everyday decisionmaking. But he also leaves room for
more paternalistic approaches to addressing cognitive errors in
decisionmaking. Government, he argues, may need to step in to regulate
some market activities in order to protect us against irrational anchoring
10. Readers interested in a lucid and enjoyable defense of the core economic view of the worldthat most people respond to incentives in a more-or-less rational way most of the time-should consult
Tim Harford's recent book The Logic of Life, which offers many empirical examples of the power of
standard economic models to explain real-world behavior. See TIM HARFORD, THE LOGIC OF LIFE:
THE RATIONAL ECONOMICS OF AN IRRATIONAL WORLD (2008). For a spirited, although narrowly
theoretical, defense of traditional economics by two eminent game theorists, see Faruk Gul &
Wolfgang Pesendorfer, The Case for Mindless Economics (2005), (mimeo, available at
http://www.princeton.edu/-pesendor/mindless.pdf).
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effects (p. 48).
Like most cognitive psychologists, Ariely is not too interested in the
"why" of irrationality, but instead is focused on the "how." Only rarely
does he pause to consider what causes individuals to think the way they
do. And his penchant for vivid anecdotal illustration of his findings gives
the book a descriptive, rather than analytic, flavor. One notable exception
is the chapter entitled "The Context of Our Character Part I," which
carries the subtitle "Why We Are Dishonest, and What We Can Do about
It."
This chapter presents an experiment on honesty involving
undergraduate and graduate students at major American universities,
including Harvard and Yale. The study showed that the majority of
participants were likely to cheat on tests when given the opportunity. But
it was also the case that the students cheated only a little bit; none of the
students claimed perfect test scores even when they were monetarily
compensated for every correct answer. Straying beyond the domain of
cognitive psychology, Ariely posits honesty as an attribute of the Freudian
super-ego which arises from the internalization of social norms (p. 203).
Ariely explains how experimental interventions designed to reinforce
super-ego functioning generate increased honesty on the part of the study
subjects.
In an early chapter on procrastination, Ariely similarly identifies the role
of "the parental voice," in helping individuals stick to their commitments
to lose weight, save for retirement, or go to the doctor. Where individuals
have a hard time internalizing the parental voice in the form of the superego, Ariely argues, external incentives may be needed. Thus, in addition
to self-insight, Ariely sees some room here for paternalistic policies
designed to control our irrational tendencies. While Ariely draws a loose
connection to psychoanalysis, there are no easy comparisons between
paternalistic regulators and the Freudian paternal figures. For one thing,
oedipal fathers do not always act in the best interests of their offspring.
Indeed, the oedipal father is one who operates in his own self-interest by
establishing the incest taboo which prohibits the son from having sexual
access to the mother. Nevertheless, Ariely's insight is in line with Freud's
view that internalization of the incest taboo and the development of the
super-ego serve the long-term interests of the child by forcing the child to
sublimate his or her libidinal desires for the mother in the service of ego
formation.
In the end, of course, Ariely does not mean to dismantle human
rationality all the way down. To the contrary, as he states in his
Introduction, the view of human beings as rational "is largely correct" (p.
xviii). Nevertheless, the cumulative total of all these chapters leaves the
reader at the end wondering if there is anything left to the idea of reasoned
decisionmaking. Ariely himself concludes the final chapter: "If I were to
distill one main lesson from the research described in this book, it is that
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we are pawns in a game whose forces we largely fail to comprehend" (p.
243). Although Ariely might be surprised to hear it, that sentence could
have come straight form the collected works of Sigmund Freud.
On the surface, Ariely's lively narrative style should appeal to readers
with a background in the humanities. But Ariely attempts to engage with
the humanities in a more substantive way as well. Although this
engagement is admirable, it is also somewhat problematic. For example, at
several moments in the book, Ariely supports his arguments by drawing a
contrast between his experimental evidence and the view of human nature
assumed by economists and (according to Ariely) portrayed by
Shakespeare. In the Introduction, Ariely interprets Hamlet's famous lines
"What a piece of work is a man! how noble in reason! how infinite in
faculty!" as reflecting Shakespeare's glorification of humans' inherent
reasoning powers. Ariely sees himself as providing experimental data that
refute what he takes to be Shakespeare's misguided confidence in man's
power of reason.
His literal reading of Hamlet's words, however, obscures the deeper
meaning in the text he quotes; it is precisely this appreciation for nuance,
irony and subtlety that gives a literary or humanist reading of the passage
so much more force than it has in Ariely's understanding. While Ariely's
scattered references to Shakespeare hint at broader connections between
scientific psychology and the humanities, his one-dimensional reading of
the passage inadvertently demonstrates the potential risks of the
experimental perspective. For Hamlet's lines cannot credibly be reduced
to a single or even dominant interpretation. Indeed, the ambiguity of this
passage is itself part of the dramatic narrative as the reader tries in vain to
determine if Hamlet is actually mad or instead feigning madness.1"
Moreover, even if Hamlet were viewed as perfectly sane, this tribute to
reason uttered by a man living in a world of betrayal, deception, suicidal
despair, and murderous passions, not to mention ghosts, can hardly be
12
taken at face value.
As discussed further below, Ariely's misreading inadvertently displays
the way in which experimental psychology tends to reduce complex
phenomena to their most simple elements, and in the process often
eliminates
uncertainty,
ambiguity,
nuance and
contradiction.

11. Stephen Greenblatt refers to Shakespeare's strategy of "opacity" which is captured by "the
enigma of the prince's suicidal melancholy and assumed madness." See STEPHEN GREENBLATT, WILL
IN THE WORLD: How SHAKESPEARE BECAME SHAKESPEARE 324 (2004) ("The opacity [of the play]

was shaped by [Shakespeare's] experience of the world and of his own inner life: his skepticism, his
pain, his sense of broken rituals, his refusal of easy consolations.").
12. At a later reference to the passage in Shakespeare, Ariely does qualify his initial reading:
"Time and again I have provided examples that are contrary to Shakespeare's depiction of us in 'What
a piece of work is a man.' In fact, these examples show that we are not noble in reason, nor infinite in
faculty, and rather weak in apprehension. (Frankly, I think Shakespeare knew that very well, and this
speech of Hamlet's is not without irony.)" (p. 232).
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Experimental psychology takes facts as it finds them, while the humanities
generally, and psychoanalysis in particular, begin with the proposition that
things are not always what they seem. In the case of Hamlet, as Ariely
himself notes toward the end of the book, the literal perspective erases the
obvious irony from Shakespeare's lines. Yet despite the misreading of
Shakespeare's passage, Ariely's literary references express a refreshing
openness on his part to the possibility that experimental researchers can
interpret their data with help from the great works of literature. In a very
appealing way, Predictably Irrational opens the door just a bit to an
exchange of ideas between economics and the humanities.
Behavioral economists clearly struggle with the implications of their
data on irrationality for public policies favoring the free market. If people
cannot be trusted to behave rationally in pursuit of their own self-interest,
the potential for welfare-enhancing "interventions" that do for people what
they cannot do for themselves is obviously enhanced. At various times
throughout the book, Ariely makes reference to the "trade-off' between
personal freedom and paternalistic interventions. In his chapter on
procrastination, for example, he writes: "Sometimes we strongly support
regulations that restrain our self-destructive behaviors, and at other times
we have equally strong feelings about our personal freedom" (p. 118).
While Ariely spends some time on this theme, the question of
paternalism (and its alternatives) is at the heart of Thaler and Sunstein's
fascinating and provocative book Nudge: Improving Decisions About
Health, Wealth, and Happiness. Nudge starts by contrasting the idealized
rational actor of economic models with the ordinary humans most of us
are or know: while "homo economicus can think like Albert Einstein, store
as much memory as IBM's Big Blue, and exercise the willpower of
Mahatma Ghandi," "[r]eal people have trouble with long division,...
sometimes forget their spouse's birthday, and have a hangover on New
Year's Day." In a clever rhetorical turn, they imagine economists (and the
people whose behavior they model) to be a different species-"Econs"while ordinary people are dubbed "Humans."' 3
Thaler and Sunstein are less concerned than Ariely with demonstrating
the existence of various cognitive errors. Rather, Nudge takes such
behavioral anomalies as more-or-less givens, and asks what we
(collectively) should do about them. Their basic answer is quite
compelling: given that ordinary people routinely and predictably make
errors in judgment, we cannot count on individuals to make choices that
maximize their own well-being. This in turn creates scope for welfareimproving governmental intervention or regulation, in ways that are not
contemplated by standard economic models in which rational individuals,
left to their own devices, are best placed to secure their own happiness.
13. Thaler and Sunstein at 6-7.
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But Thaler and Sunstein are careful not to go overboard in their
interventionism: they still want to leave as much decision-making as
possible in the hands of individuals, but to structure the problems
individuals encounter so as to leave them better-placed to make welfareenhancing choices. They call this regulatory program "choice
architecture," which in essence means setting up choices (including the
provision of information) so that they are framed in a maximally useful
way, while preserving for individuals the ultimate right to make decisions
governing their own lives.
A compelling and important example (discussed at length in Chapter 6
of Nudge) concerns decisions about retirement saving. Many people
apparently have great difficulty putting away money for the distant future.
The evidence for this problem comes from a variety of sources and is quite
strong-people routinely wish and plan to save more, but then routinely
fail to act on their own clear desires. An Econ would find such behavior
incomprehensible, of course, since any Econ who "wanted" to save more,
would simply do so. 14 But suppose we recognize, with the behavioralists,
that under-saving is likely among "humans." What should we as a society
do about it? One possibility is simply to mandate more saving, but this is
unattractive because it impinges on individual liberty, is likely to create
resentment, and is difficult to calibrate: not everybody needs or wants to
save more, and a mandate would somehow have to pick the appropriate
level of savings for everyone or else require incredibly complex rules for
adjusting the mandated saving level to individual circumstances. Another
possibility is education: just tell people how important it is to save, and
perhaps that will convince them to save more. In fact, however, that
doesn't work well; many individuals already want to save more, and
information about how important saving is does not really alter their
behavior much.
Thaler and Sunstein instead endorse a clever alternative, specifically
designed to offset the cognitive and willpower failures that lead to undersaving: the Save More Tomorrow plan, under which participants agree
(today) to save an increasing portion of their future income. The plan
works: those who are offered the choice to sign up for it do so, and end up
saving more. But it works without any compulsion: participants are not
forced to enroll, and can back out at any time if they change their minds.
Nudge is full of practical suggestions like this, including ways to non14. Indeed, a classic analytic "trick" in economics is the "revealed preference" argument, which
says that to know whether an individual "prefers" option A over option B, we need only look at
whether she chooses A instead of B when either is possible. See Paul A. Samuelson, Consumption
Theory in Terms of Revealed Preference, 15 ECONOMICA 243 (1948) (developing the argument that
the preferences-utility function---of a rational individual can be uncovered by seeing how the
individual reacts to a series of appropriately-chosen binary choices). By a series of such binary
comparisons, Samuelson showed, it is possible to uncover an individual's underlying preferences in
full detail.
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coercively increase organ donation by changing the default rules for who
can be a donor, 5 improve prescription drug coverage under Medicaid by
assigning people to plans that are likely to be optimal given their historical
purchasing patterns, 16 and so on.' 7
Nudge is an immensely provocative and practical book, but it does raise
some unanswered questions, particularly at a broad thematic level. For
example, the argument for choice architecture must make the case that we
(the government? experts?) know what choices people should be nudged
into making. Sometimes the answers seem clear-most people should
(and want to) lose weight, save more, etc. But this will not always be the
case, and one may wonder whether governmental regulators, who have no
obvious incentives to overcome their own cognitive failings, are wellpositioned to make these choices themselves. 8 Given that choice
architecture strongly influences the outcome of decisions, why should we
trust government regulators to decide what good choices should look like?
While Thaler and Sunstein directly address the obvious tension between
libertarian and paternalistic aims at the level of individual decisionmaking,
they side-step the issue of how government should go about identifying
what makes people's lives "longer, healthier and better" (p. 5). In a book
devoted to cataloguing the ways in which human decisionmaking is
flawed, this seems an important oversight. We agree with Thaler and
Sunstein that "there is no such thing as a 'neutral' [architectural] design"
(p. 3), but some defense of decisionmaking at the governmental level
would make their arguments for even limited or "libertarian" paternalism
stronger.
To elaborate a bit, Thaler and Sunstein argue that most people would
choose to be thinner, to quit smoking, and to save for retirement.
Although they assert that good choices mean only what the decisionmaker

15. Most states require you to declare that you want to be an organ donor; Thaler and Sunstein
(Nudge, Chapter 11) propose adopting the "presumed consent" default (used in many European
countries), under which you have to opt-out from being an organ donor instead of opting-in. They also
offer other helpful suggestions about how to structure donation programs so as to capitalize on
altruistic norms, and so on.
16. Nudge, Chapter 10.
17. Some of their specific proposals seem at odds with their overall behavioral framework,
however, and a weakness of the book is that it sometimes reads like a grab-bag of clever ideas rather
than a coherent analysis. In particular, consider Thaler and Sunstein's suggestion that patients should
be allowed to opt-out of pain and suffering damages for medical malpractice (Chapter 14) in exchange
for lower fees up front. As Tom Baker and Timothy D. Lytton point out, the decision to trade-off
reduced coverage for lower fees is likely to be subject to precisely the kinds of biases and flawed
judgments that Sunstein and Thaler document in many other contexts, and is thus unlikely to be the
kind of choice patients will make well. See Tom Baker & Timothy D. Lytton, Allowing Patients to
Waive the Right to Sue for Medical Malpractice: A Response to Thaler and Sunstein (U. Penn. Inst.
available at
Paper
No.
09-06,
Feb.
19,
2009)
for
L.
& Econ.
Res.
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstracLid=1349836.
18. See, e.g., Edward Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 133 (2006)
(arguing that "flaws in human cognition should make us more, not less, wary about trusting
government decisionmaking").
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would choose given perfect decisionmaking, it is simply assumed that
people would choose to be thinner, healthier and more financially stable in
retirement. But no evidence for this empirical claim is ever produced.
The authors might not disagree that choice architecture must rely on
welfare norms shared by experts in the relevant fields to determine in what
direction individuals should be "nudged." For example, in the chapter on
"Privatizing Marriage," the authors propose "that the relevant rules should
nudge the outcome in a way that will help the weakest parties - usually
women" (p. 224). While a laudable goal, it is not an architectural design
that they can justify as better in the sense of something these hypothetical
men and women would have chosen. Nevertheless, accepting this
inescapable tension between libertarian values and paternalistic goals,
Thaler and Sunstein give us an original and compelling blueprint for
addressing some of the most vexing public policy issues of our time.
II. PREDICTIONS AND NUDGES FROM THE HUMANITIES PERSPECTIVE
As captured in both Predictably Irrational and Nudge, the behavioral
economics project has something in common with the humanities to the
extent it seeks to understand the contours and workings of the human
mind. On its face, this project is one that humanities scholars would
recognize as their own. But the question is whether the similarities go
beyond mere surface generalities.
In this Section, we make two
observations. First, in their particulars, behavioral economics and the
humanities approach the study of human behavior in very different ways.
Second, despite these differences in approach, there are certain
fundamental psychological postulates common to both disciplines.
Acknowledging the shared psychological ideas between behavioral
economics and the humanities raises the possibility of fruitful
interdisciplinary exchange between these two traditionally rival fields.
First, the differences. Just because they declare their focus to be
"Humans" rather than "Econs," it does not follow that Thaler and Sunstein
offer complete or compelling descriptions of what it means to be human.
Nor do Ariely's "predictably irrational" subjects resemble the tortured
souls of a Doestoyevsky novel or a Freudian case history. Thaler and
Sunstein's index contains no entries for "Love," "Hatred," "Fear," or
"Revenge." "Lust" is also absent. 9 To be fair, neither of the books aspires
to say anything about these issues. But the point remains that although a
behavioral approach can enrich economic models in many contexts, it
does not obviously provide much insight into key questions that interest
humanists, in large part because humanists have a different intellectual
19. Behavioral economics, like Katherine Hepburn's performance (as assessed by Dorothy
Parker), "runs the gamut of emotions, from A to B." Ariely does have an amusing, if slightly off-color,
chapter (Ch. 5, The Influence ofArounsal) on how sexual arousal influences decision-making.
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agenda and a different view of what counts as important knowledge. °
That difference is well-described by the distinction between nomothetic
and idiographic approaches to knowledge first proposed by Wilhelm
Windelband. 21 The former seeks to distill general laws of human behavior;
the latter seeks to understand the individual (idiosyncratic, contingent, and
historically-situated). So if an individualized, novelistic, particularist,
detailed portrait is what one is looking for, then behavioral economics is
scarcely less nomothetic than its predecessors. Cognitive psychology is
limited to the extent it views the individual in terms of general
characteristics shared by most people, in contrast to humanistic
psychologies which tend to emphasize the complexity and uniqueness of
individual experience.
Yet behavioral economics may be less universalizing than it might seem
at first glance, particularly when evaluated against the traditional rational
actor model. The books under review here illuminate the salutary
complexity and heterogeneity that behavioral economics has begun to
introduce into mainstream economics. By and large, traditional economists
assume that people are essentially homogenous. In fact, that assumption is
key to the explanatory power economics purports to offer, since its results
derive from models that are claimed to apply to virtually all humans. 2
Heterogeneity is introduced only in tiny increments, and only when it is
thought to be absolutely necessary. For example, economists are only
barely beginning to address questions of whether there are meaningful
gender differences in preferences. 23 Of course, parsimony is not a bad
thing per se, and economists have always had an understandable
preference for simple, tractable models. 24 But such a strong preference for
20.

For example, contrast the humanist struggle to come to terms with the meaning of death (e.g.,

ROBERT A. BURT, DEATH IS THAT MAN TAKING NAMES (2004)) with Wojciech Kupczuk & Joel B.

Slemrod, Denial ofDeath and Economic Behavior (Nat. Bur. Of Econ. Res. Working Paper W 11485,
2005) (presenting a model that demonstrates that "refusal to face up to the reality of death may help
explain a wide range of empirical phenomena, including the underutilization of tax-advanced inter
vivos gifts and inadequate purchase of life insurance.")
21. The term was introduced into the philosophy of psychology by Gordon W. Allport. For an
elaboration of his ideas on the subject, see, e.g., The General and the Unique in Psychological
Science, 30 J. PERSONALITY 405 (1962).
22. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AMER.
ECON. REV. 76 (1977) (arguing that tastes do not differ importantly among people, and like "the
Rocky Mountains[ ] are there, will be there next year too, and are the same to all men"). The reductio
ad absurdum of this tendency is the widespread use of models purporting to explain the behavior of
the entire macro-economy as if it consisted of only a single "representative agent." For a critique of
this notion see Alan P. Kirman, Whom or What Does the Representative Individual Represent?, 6 J.
ECON. PERSPECTIVES 117 (1992).

23. For a recent survey, see Rachel Croson and Uri Gneezy, Gender Differences in Preferences,
47 J. ECON. LIT. 448 (2009) (concluding that women are more risk averse than men and that women
are more sensitive to cues in the experimental environment than are men. Id. at 463. See also James J.
Heckman, Shadow Wages, Market Wages and Labor Supply, 42 ECONOMETRICA 679 (1974)
(constructing model of women's labor supply).
24. Albert Einstein urged scientists to make everything as simple as possible, but not simpler, in
his Herbert Spencer Lecture at Oxford in 1933. See Albert Einstein, On the Method of Theoretical
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homogeneity runs the risk of obscuring essential facts about how the
world works.
In contrast, behavioral scholarship offers two important openings (as yet
not well exploited) for economists to come to terms with human
heterogeneity. First, behavioral experiments in either the lab or the field
almost never demonstrate that absolutely everyone is subject to a bias of
the same size/degree. Cognitive biases are tendencies, not (usually)
universals. Some people do not experience an endowment effect, at least
in some settings." Some people do not agree to pay more for a bottle of
wine, despite being 'prompted' to do so by anchoring to their high social
security number. That in turn means that we can and should usefully begin
asking what makes biases larger for some people than others: education,
age, 'culture," the behavior of other actors, training, personality, early-life
experiences-the list is potentially quite long. And although these issues
have not yet begun to occupy the attention of most behavioral economists,
the behavioral turn opens up an intellectual space in which these questions
can at least be recognized and addressed, instead of minimized as they are
in much of traditional economics.26
An obvious reason for differences across people--obvious, at least, to
many humanists writing since Freud-is differing experiences in early
childhood. Although economists have paid relatively little attention to the
Physics, I PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 2, 163-69 (April 1934) ("It can scarcely be denied that the
supreme goal of all theory is to make the irreducible basic elements as simple and as few as possible
without having to surrender the adequate representation of a single datum of experience.").
25. See, e.g., Charles R. Plott and Kathryn Zeiler, The Willingness to Pay--Willingness to Accept
Gap, the "Endowment Effect, " Subject Misconceptions, and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting
Valuations, 95 AMER. ECON. REV. 530 (2005) (presenting experimental results in which the
endowment effect disappears when subjects are given practice and have incentives to reveal their true
preferences). John A. List, Does Market Experience EliminateMarket Anomalies?, 118 Q. J. ECON. 41
(2003) (using a "field experiment" to show that experienced traders do not suffer from an endowment
effect).
26. For a provocative start in this direction, see Shane Fredrick, Cognitive Reflection and
Decision Making, 19 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 25 (2005). Fredrick developed a set of three "easy, but
tricky" logic questions: for example "a bat and a ball together cost $ .10. The bat costs SI more than
the ball. How much does the ball cost?" The intuitively obvious, but wrong, answer is 10¢. (The
correct answer is 5g.) The scale constructed from these questions does not measure IQ, but seems
instead to capture some kind of cognitive style-the ability to reflect on one's answers rather than
impulsively giving the first answer that pops into one's mind. What's surprising is that the answers to
these questions predict all kinds of differences across people, including their preferences for present
vs. future consumption, their willingness to take monetary gambles, and their failure to conform to the
predictions of the expected utility model that is at the core of what it means to be a rational decisionmaker under conditions of uncertainty. Fredricks' work thus represents the beginning of an effort to
look behind cognitive biases and ask whether there are more fundamental aspects of, for want of a
better term, "personality" that shape people's behavior, including-but not limited to-cognitive
behavior. See also Dimitri Hryshko et al., Childhood Determinants of Risk Aversion: The Long
available
at
(Sept.
30,
2008),
Compulsory
Education
Shadow
of
http://www.uh.edu/-bsorense/LongShadow.pdf (suggesting that higher levels of parental education
cause lower levels of risk aversion in children). See also Raquel Femihndez and Alessandra Fogli,
Culture: An Empirical Investigation of Beliefs, Work and Fertility, I AMER. ECON. J.
MACROECONOMICS 146 (2009) (showing effects of country of father's origin on US-born women's
labor force participation and fertility behavior).
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psychological development of rational decisionmaking, the behavioral turn
may help to focus attention on the importance of childhood experience in
shaping adult behavior. For example, in a series of articles, Nobel
Laureate James Heckman and his coauthors have begun tracing the
importance of early childhood experiences for subsequent development of
both cognitive and non-cognitive attributes or traits.2 7 Patience,
perseverance, optimism, and the ability to delay gratification are obviously
vital to material and emotional success in today's world. As economists
start to appreciate the significant degree to which such traits are shaped by
early childhood experiences (especially by schools and families),
economics and humanistic psychology may begin to converge on an
important truth about the importance of childhood in creating the
conditions for human flourishing, including the ability to rationally and
effectively pursue one's interests and goals.
A second source of heterogeneity implicit in behavioral work is the
sheer number of biases that have been identified by researchers in
cognitive psychology and behavioral economics. Thus we have hindsight
bias, the availability heuristic, loss aversion, hyperbolic discounting, the
endowment effect, optimism bias, and base-rate neglect, to name only a
handful of the biases that have been identified in behavioral economics.
The multitude of biases contrasts markedly with the singularity of
rationality. To paraphrase Tolstoy, "Rational actors are all alike, but every
irrational actor is irrational in his or her own way." Fortunately, not
everyone is equally subject to the humbling multitude of cognitive failures
to which we humans are prone. But the proliferating catalog of cognitive
lapses will exert pressure on economists to reconsider their assumption of
human homogeneity.
Not only may behavioral economics be more sensitive to idiographic
factors than is generally assumed, humanistic psychologies such as
psychoanalysis do in fact have nomothetic features. For example, while
psychoanalysis locates meaning in the smallest details of the individual's
27. See, e.g., Lex Borghans et al., The Economics and Psychology of Personal Traits (NBER
Working Paper 13810, 2008). (available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13810) On the possibility
that very intensive (and expensive) schooling could suffice to close the racial achievement gap, see
Will Dobbie & Roland G. Fryer Jr., Are High-QualitySchools Enough to Close the Achievement Gap?
Evidencefrom a Bold Social Experiment in Harlem, (unpublished working paper, 2009), availableat
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/fryer/files/hcz%204.15.2009.pdf. See also PAUL TOUGH,
WHATEVER

IT TAKES

(2008)

(reporting

on

Harlem

Children's

Zone);

RICHARD

NESBITT,

INTELLIGENCE AND How TO GET IT (2009) (suggesting that high-quality early childhood intervention
can lead to permanent gains in achievement and social functioning). Recent corroborating evidence
comes from David Deming, Early Childhood Intervention and Life-Cycle Skill Development: Evidence
from Head Start, 1 APPLIED ECONOMICS 111 (2009), who concludes that ordinary Head Start
programs produce gains in young adult outcomes that are about 80 percent as large as those realized
by high-quality programs, at only about 60 percent of the cost. Although most studies find that early
childhood interventions produce only temporary gains in IQ, the evidence for permanent gains in other
important aspects of social functioning (grade retention, criminal participation, unemployment, etc) is
increasingly strong.
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personal experience, it also provides a template for understanding more
universal phenomena such as repression, defenses, transference,
ambivalence and guilt. Indeed, Freud is infamous for positing the
universality of the Oedipus complex, notwithstanding widespread
variations in family forms both within and across cultures. Modern
psychoanalysts may have abandoned this particular developmental
milestone, but the field still offers an account of psychological processes
such as defenses (e.g., intellectualization, reaction formation), character
traits (e.g., narcissism, paranoia), and interpersonal phenomena (e.g.,
identification, projection, transference), man of which are now widely
accepted by psychologists and the broader culture.
Clearly, methodological differences between behavioral economics and
humanistic psychologies cannot be overlooked. To the extent humanistic
psychologies identify universal mental processes such as repression or
unconscious conflict, these traits are less amenable to scientific study than
are cognitive errors in judgment. Most humanistic psychologies such as
psychoanalysis find their "data" in the clinical setting, and occasionally in
observational accounts. Cognitive psychology, on the other hand, relies
heavily on experimental data. And there are problems with each approach.
Humanistic psychologies are vulnerable to biases arising from
subjectivity; but cognitive psychology arguably suffers from
"experimental bias," which we can define as the biased perceptions that
arise from studying only what is easily subject to experimental
investigation. For example, it is easy to manipulate "anchoring"
experimentally by getting subjects to think of the last two digits of their
social security numbers and then asking them to place bids on bottles of
wine. It is much more difficult to manipulate repression by altering
conditions of early childhood, even if that were ethical. Studying what is
easy to study via experiments is itself a form of bias that inadvertently
directs attention away from other more complex mental phenomena.
That said, there is no reason why rigor and generalizability can only
arise from experiments. Astrophysics is a perfectly valid science that does
not really rely directly on experimental data. Neither do large parts of
geology, epidemiology, and so on. Likewise, it should be possible to test
various theories of what causes repression or guilt (and even to explore
whether these are actually meaningful concepts) by means of nonexperimental data that are analyzed in a 'scientific' way (as opposed to
narrative case studies, etc.). 28 Some of this work is already being done.

28. Adolf Grunbaum suggests that at least "[s]ome of Freud's etiologic postulates are potentially
confirmable by epidemiologic findings, without any recourse at all to data from the analytic treatment
setting, let alone to the experiences had by patients when their repressions are being undone in that
clinical milieu." Adolf Grunbaum, THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS: A PHILOSOPHICAL

CRITIQUE (1984) at 38 (emphasis in original). Grunbaum gives as an example Freud's theory that
"repressed homosexual love is causally necessary for paranoid delusions." Id. The theory implies that
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For example, researchers are testing psychotherapeutic treatment
modalities using random assignment to see which treatments, for which
mental conditions, actually work best in some objective sense.29
And humanistic psychologists might benefit from the experimental
findings of cognitive psychology as well. Some of the key insights of
cognitive psychology utilized by behavioral economists can be understood
to supplement and fortify humanistic views about how the mind
operates.3 ° To take one clear example, cognitive psychologists have
recently discovered the existence of unconscious mental affects. Recent
experimental research into implicit affects demonstrates that unconscious
emotions and biases affect individual decisionmaking. 31' This research
obviously strongly supports psychoanalytic clinical accounts going back
more than a century showing the existence of unconscious emotions and
conflicts. The importance of early childhood experience for adult
decisionmaking is another area where cognitive researchers are finding
data that supports fundamental tenets of clinical psychoanalytic research.
Although many cognitive and psychoanalytic researchers regard each
other with suspicion, if not outright hostility, the research itself suggests
some important commonalities. Recognizing these commonalities has the
potential for broadening and enriching work in both economics and the
humanities.
To be sure, behavioral economics has some important drawbacks from a
humanistic perspective, the most significant of which is a decidedly
cramped or "thin" conception of human (ir)rationality. Humans are
irrational, in either the behavioral or standard economic account, when
they do not have a well-behaved utility function,32 or are subject to
cognitive errors such as the anchoring bias described earlier. Cognitive
biases (and failures of willpower) are thus examples of irrationality in this
sense because they prevent an individual from doing what he or she would
acknowledge to be in his or her self-interest.33 From a humanistic
as the repression of homosexuality decreases over time, the frequency of paranoid delusions should
also decrease.
29. Boston Change Process Study Group, http://www.changeprocess.org/index.html (describing
group of psychoanalysts who believe in testing the efficacy of different psychotherapeutic modalities).
30. See, e.g., Anne C. Dailey, Imagination and Choice, 35 L. & SOC. INQ. 1 (2010) (describing
reality testing, effects of early childhood, and unconscious processes as three areas of common interest
to cognitive and humanistic psychologies ); see also DANIEL WEGNER, THE ILLUSION OF CONSCIOUS
WILL (2003), TIMOTHY W. WILSON, STRANGERS TO OURSELVES: DISCOVERING THE ADAPTIVE
UNCONSCIOUS (2002) (offering empirical assessments of importance of unconscious mental processes
from a non-psychoanalytic perspective).
31. Anthony Greenwald & Mahzarin Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem,
and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 4 (1995).
32. For example, suppose someone is offered a choice between option A and option B, and picks
(prefers) B. They are then offered a choice between option B and option C, and pick C. If it were the
case that when given a choice between A and C, the individual did not prefer C to A, this would entail
a failure of rationality.
33. For example, someone whose willingness to pay for a bottle of wine is "anchored" to an
arbitrary number is potentially subject to over-paying if the seller can figure out a way to create an
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perspective, this thin conception of rationality fails to account for the
myriad ways in which human behavior in the real world is motivated by
34
deeply "irrational" factors, not just relatively minor cognitive "glitches.
To take just one example, both Ariely and Thaler/Sunstein interpret
individuals' inability to stick to their diets or to save for retirement as
lapses of self-control. They may be right that most instances of dieting or
savings failures can be attributed simply to a lack of willpower, in the
sense that the short term gratification of eating or spending overpowers the
long-term benefits of a slim waistline or secure retirement years.
Procrastination, too, is viewed as an issue of self-control.
But what if willpower is not the only factor which determines whether
one orders the chocolate mousse or buys the expensive new car? Perhaps
some people engage in self-defeating behavior for other reasons as well.
Humanistic psychologies suggest that some people may break their vows
to diet out of unconscious guilt or self-punitive feelings. Recognizing that
human behavior can be motivated not only by desire for pleasure but also
from self-destructive aims is central to psychoanalytic thinking. Indeed,
understanding that what looks like the failure of self-control is really the
success of self-destructive urges is what led Freud to abandon his original
libidinal drive theory for his later structural account of the aggressive and
self-destructive components of psychic life.35
Even if dieting and retirement savings are issues of self-control, the
lessons to be drawn from these examples may apply only to a limited
sphere of decisionmaking associated with what is called "cold cognition."
The subjects of behavioral economics are typically eager to turn away
from whatever irrational behavior they may be engaged in, and can thus be
easily "nudged" into making better choices.36 In large measure, that is
because the kinds of choices they get wrong are low-affect and relatively
simple. Saving for retirement or choosing a prescription drug insurance
plan are important choices, to be sure; but they are typically "cool"
decisions made under conditions most likely to engage primarily cognitive
thought processes. In contrast, many of the choices relevant to law such
as criminal confessions, signing a prenuptial agreement, or bringing a
claim for sexual harassment are often made under conditions of significant
emotional investment. As one of us has argued elsewhere, decisions

artificially high anchoring point.
34. An economist would not say that altruism or self-destructive behavior are irrational, because
irrationality means failure to maximize your utility function, whatever that implies. If you get utility
from suffering pain, then failure to inflict pain on yourself would be irrational. If you get utility from
helping others, then failure to do so would be irrational. Economics is largely agnostic on the content
of people's utility functions. Some of the studies cited above (supra notes 22 and 23) can be
understood as revealing how early childhood experiences shape preferences and tastes later in life.
35.

PETER GAY, FREUD: A LIFE FOR OUR TIME (1988).

36. Indeed, Thaler and Sunstein's policy prescriptions flow precisely from the assumption that
they are helping people make the choices they would want to make if only they could be fully rational.
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involving
close
personal
relationships,
emotionally-charged
circumstances, or important life decisions are the most likely to benefit
from a psychoanalytic understanding of the decisionmaking process.37
Whether a particular behavior is understood as a lapse of self-control or
a triumph of self-destructive urges will often make a big difference in how
we understand the behavior and how (or whether) we seek to change it or
mediate its effects. If the problem is a lapse of self-control, then strategies
designed to reinforce willpower through incentives might be effective.
Ariely provides numerous examples of the ways in which willpower can
be shored-up by external means. One of his favorite examples is the "selfcontrol credit card" which would allow individuals to limit ex ante their
own monetary transactions in particular situations, such as chocolate
buying or entertainment spending, with penalties attached for exceeding
the limits (p. 123-24). But if more than willpower is at stake, then, as
psychoanalysts have long understood, these urges can be strongly resistant
to change. Addressing psychological resistance is a subject of special
interest and importance to psychoanalytic psychology. Because resistance
is hard to measure in the laboratory, it illustrates the way in which
humanistic psychology may have something to teach behavioral
economics about the dynamics of human decisionmaking in the real
world. Why might individuals choose not to opt for the self-control credit
card, or why did the bank which Ariely approached with the idea never
pursue it? Individuals' resistance to overcoming cognitive and emotional
biases may play as big a role as the biases themselves. Exploring how
humanistic insights such as resistance can contribute to the behavioral
revolution is a worthy goal for psychologically-inclined law and
humanities scholars.
III. CONCLUSION

The behavioral revolution in economics arose in large part as a response
to the demonstration (by economists and psychologists) of empirical
anomalies in human behavior.38 But not just any behavior: what gave these
anomalies particular force was that they concerned the kinds of
phenomena economics purported to understand, explain and predict:
financial markets that do not price assets appropriately, individuals who
37. See Dailey, Imagination and Choice, supra note 30.
38. Indeed, one of the co-authors of Nudge, Richard H. Thaler, had a quarterly (now, occasional)
feature in the Journal of Economic Perspectives entitled "Anomalies" in which he and his coauthors
identified phenomenona that the standard economic model should have been able to explain (or to
explain away as impossible) but could not. These included such puzzles as why closed-end mutual
funds traded for less than the value of the shares they contained, why people are both much more and
much less risk-averse than economic theory predicts should be possible, why the same job (e.g,
janitor) pays more in some industries than in others, and so on. Many of these essays are collected in a
single volume, The Winner's Curse: Paradoxes and Anomalies of Economic Life (1994), although
Thaler has continued to compile additional anomalies since that work was published.
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make inconsistent choices over time, people who are sometimes much
less-selfish than economic theory predicts, and so on.
The "fix" for many of these anomalies has turned out to involve
modifications of the rational actor assumptions, but, for the most part, the
fix has not led economists away from the particular kinds of human
behavior that have constituted the discipline's traditional subject matter.
This point is worth stressing because ultimately the behavioral turn in
economics is not designed to provide a more rounded account of human
nature, to "humanize" economic actors, or to incorporate psychological
irrationality into economic models. It is designed to help solve certain
intra-disciplinary problems or puzzles.
To the extent that the behavioral findings enrich economists' toolkits,
they should be considered a success. But even after behavioral insights
have been fully incorporated into economics, humanists will still have a
virtual monopoly in answering the kinds of questions they deem to be
important. You would not ask an economist why someone would confess
to a murder he did not commit.39 You should not expect a rational
explanation to offer a full account of why someone would sign a
prenuptial agreement that is clearly against her (or his) obvious interests.4"
Neither, however, would you call a humanist for advice on exchange rate
policy or the antitrust consequences of unbundling the internet browser
from Microsoft's Windows operating system.
To return to the insight of Wallace Stevens that began this review, we
recognize that there is much of life that is not adequately explained (or
even recognized) by the rational economic approach to human behavior.
The insights offered by behavioral economists are best understood as new
tools to be used in the analysis of the discipline's traditional problems.
Economists will not be putting on sombreros any time in the immediate
future, nor should humanists be taking theirs off. The key to understand
human behavior, in all its richness and complexity, is to adopt the kinds of
tools appropriate for the task at hand. Both rational social science and
humanistic methods have their places and their uses, and there is no reason
to believe that there is a single "correct" approach to understanding all
aspects of human behavior. Nevertheless, as we have explained here, each
discipline has something to offer the other, particularly in areas-such as
the existence of unconscious emotions or the importance of early
childhood-where economists and humanists can agree. Predictably
Irrational and Nudge give us reason to think that these points of
psychological agreement between economics and the humanities are very
much worth exploring.
39. See PETER BROOKS, TROUBLING CONFESSIONS: SPEAKING GUILT IN LAW & LITERATURE
(2001).
40. Dailey, Imaginationand Choice, supra note 30.

